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Icv/HoT: NORWEGIAN AND FINNISH POLlCV 
TOWARD THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Mia Bennett 
From the outside, Norway and Finland appear to be similar countries. Both have 
transparent democratic governments, strong welfare programs, and a high quality of life. Yet 
one of the most marked differences between the two Nordic countries concerns their 
policies toward the European Union: Norway rejected European Conununity membership 
in 1972 and EU membership in 1994, while Finland joined the EU in 1995 and has since 
been a strong advocate of expansion. In seeking to understand why two relatively similar 
countries had such contrasting policies regarding membership, some scholars have 
emphasized the issue of identity (Ingebritsen and Larson 207, 0sterud 38, Tiilikainen 173). 
According to this argument, Norway saw itself as separate from Europe and was loath to 
give up its hard-won sovereignty, since Denmark and Sweden had each governed the 
country for centuries. Finland, on the other hand, actually regarded membership as a means 
of protecting its sovereignty and also as a means of underscoring its 'Europeanness.' While 
identity certainly is a valid factor, a comparative geopolitical analysis taking into account the 
influence of geogrdphy on factors of security and economics provides more tangible 
evidence to explain the differences between the two countries' policies. In terms of security, 
Norway's isolation from the rest of Europe, small border with Russia, and membership in 
the North Adantic Treaty Organization made any extra security provided by the EU 
negligible. On the other hand, Finland's proximity to Eastern Europe, long border with 
Russia, and lack of membership in NATO meant that the EU offered vital security to a 
country that for decades lived in the shadow of the Soviet Union. Economically, both 
Norway and Finland depended on the export of natural resources. Norway's oil, its main 
export, helped subsidize its heavily protected agricultural and fishing industries. Oil also 
encountered no protectionist m easures from the EU, which meant that trade relations were 
already unrestricted at the time of the accession debates. Contrastingly, Finland's economy 
was in dire straits at the time of EU accession. Finland had historically relied on the 
neighboring USSR as its biggest trade partner, so when it collapsed, so did the Finnish 
economy. Furthermore, in Finland, the leading export sector of timber, the farmers' political 
party, and the general public all supported EU membership, whereas in Norway, all three of 
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these groups opposed EU lnembership. In the near future, with Norway's economic health 
essentially guaranteed by the rising price of oil, it does not look like the country will soon 
join the ED. Finland, however, will likely continue to support EU expansion and reject 
NATO membership, particularly with an ascendant Russia on its borders. 
A BRIEF GEOPOLITICAL HISTORY 
Geography plays a major role in determining the foreign policy of a country. States 
relatively separated from the rest of the world tend to be more isolationist than those situated 
in the milieu of other countries. A glance at a map of Europe demonstrates the differences 
in geographic location between Norway and Finland (see Map 1, Appendix). While both 
countries are on the northernmost periphery of Europe, Norway is more isolated. For 
centuries, Bergen, in western Norway, was the only town with major links to continental 
Europe (Eriksen 12). Furtherm.ore, unlike Finland, Norway did not lie between any great 
powers . The country was relatively safe from invasion and also free to determine its own 
foreign policy without fear of angering its neighbors. As soon as Norway achieved 
independence in 1905, it chose to be neutral, and its location helped keep it removed from 
great power conflicts. The major exception was during World War II, when the Nazis 
disregarded the country's neutrality and invaded. However, after the war ended, a weakened, 
occupied, and divided Germany made the threat of invasion minimal. As will be explained, 
Norway consequently ended its unsuccessful policy of neutrality and had the political 
wherewithal to do so since no resurgent country was breathing down its back. 
Historically, Finland was a small state trapped between the two large and powerful 
countries of Russia and Sweden. This precarious geopolitical situation caused a two-front 
problem that exposed the country 'to invasion and war from both sides. Finland represented 
the frontier to be conquered (Karsh 47). During the Napoleonic Wars, its strategic location 
led Russia and Sweden to war over possession of its territory. After nearly six hundred years 
of Swedish rule, Finland was surrendered to Russia, which controlled the country until 
1917. During the close of Russian rule, as the Kremlin's fear of the burgeoning Finnish 
nationalist movement grew, soldiers occupied Helsinki ("Fear Revolt"). The Finns were 
virtual prisoners in their own country and had to work hard to appease the Russians, who 
presented a security threat not only from the outside, but also from within Finland's own 
borders. Even after it finally won independence in 1917, Finland had to walk a fine line 
between the Soviet Union and Europe. During World War II, Finland and the USSR went 
to war, and it was not until 1947 that a peace treaty was signed. Yet even with the peace 
treaty, the USSR still managed to heavily influence Finnish foreign policy. The presence of 
a great power on Finland's borders essentially nude neutrality the only safe foreign policy 
option. 
POST-WORLD WAR FACTORS: HARD VERSUS SOFT SECURITY 
Geopolitical history leads directly into a discussion of the post-war security strategies 
of Norway and Finland. The post-war context, particularly the issue of NATO membership 
versus non-alignment, seems more relevant to the debates surrounding EU membership 
than residual fears of foreign domination. While Ingebritsen and Larson point out Norway's 
protectiveness of its sovereignty as a reason for its rejection of the EU (215), Finland lacked 
true sovereignty for even longer, since the 12th century. Certainly, Norway was ruled by 
Denmark and Sweden for hundreds of years, but these two counties are now peaceful and 
do not posses any imperialist intentions. It is vastly improbable that either Denmark or 
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Sweden would ever attempt to reconquer Norway, as these three Scandinavian countries 
have had close and productive relationships for decades. Denmark, Sweden, and Norway 
have all constructed national identities based on peace and multilateralism and are 
economically interdependent, making the costs of war and conflict astronomical compared 
to the benefits of furthered cooperation. Therefore, it is likely the NATO-based defense 
policy that Norway formulated after WWII, rather than fear of foreign rule or concerns over 
dim..inished sovereignty, provided a more important reason for the country's rejection ofEU 
membership. On the other hand, the major issue for Finnish foreign policymakers had long 
been the Soviet threat, which was still fresh in the national consciousness as accession was 
debated in the early 1990s. Compared to Norway, Finland had a much more tenuous 
relationship with its former ruler. Even now, particularly as Russia has been reasserting its 
presence in international affairs, Finland must act somewhat cautious. Membership in the 
EU allows the country to secure itself against its former ruler in a non-aggressive manner. 
Whereas Norway's occupier, Germany, was severely weakened after WWII , Finland's 
vanquisher, the USSR, was still powerful. Thus, foreign enemies did not bear the same kind 
of influence over Norway as they did over Finland. Mter WWII , Norway was free to pursue 
its own policy, and it rejected neutrality once it realized its two inherent failings. First, while 
Norway had remained neutral during WWII, it was still invaded by Germany. Second, 
Finland's policy of neutrality allowed the USSR much leverage over it (Gstohl 34). As a 
result, and in light of the fragile environment of post-war Europe and the growing East-
West tensions of the Cold War, Norway joined NATO, a collective security organization 
positi0'1ed against the USSR. If Norway was to be attacked or invaded again, NATO 
niembership would guarantee military assistance from all the other member countries. 
Joining NATO meant giving up its long-held policy of neutrality, but since that had already 
failed, it was time for Norway to pursue a more decisive foreign policy. The Soviet threat 
was thereby handed over to be dealt with in NATO headquarters in Brussels. Norway's 
decision to join NATO contradicts the idea that the country was worried about losing 
sovereignty, because here, all-important military decisions were now made in concert with 
other member states rather than individually. 
Norway's membership in NATO gave it a strong reason to rebuff the EO. While 
NATO provided hard security, the EU only provided a more intangible "soft security" 
(Mouritzen 102-103). This soft security could be defined as any type of threat reduction not 
involving outright m..ilitary defense. Soft security in the way of measures such as anns 
reduction could be important against a country like the USSR, but this was not a pressing 
issue for Norway, which did not share Finland's history of fearing the Russian bear. 
Norway's experience in WWII could also have engendered a preference for hard security 
measures to reduce the risk of future military invasion or occupation. 'Soft' policies like 
neutrality had not worked. Furthermore, by some accounts, the EU even depended on 
NATO for security Oakobson 121). As part of the Western European Union, several of the 
EU countries signed the Berlin agreement in 1996, creating the European Security and 
Defense Identity. This agreement allowed European countries use of NATO m..ilitary 
resources. Therefore, EU membership could be seen as redundant for Norway, as it did not 
bring any additional hard security. Norway was more concerned about definitive policies 
and military protection, which the EU could not offer at the time. If the EU were to 
develop hard defense measures separate from NATO, then Norway might be more inclined 
to join. But for Norway, when EU membership was debated, its security concerns were 
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already satisfied. 
Finland's security, however, was still in a precarious condition post-World War II and 
through the accession debates. Finland lost to Russia during the war. After a peace treaty 
with the USSR was finally signed in 1947, Finland entered into the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the USSR. As a nlilitary cooperation treaty, if the 
USSR was attacked by Germany through Finland, it was obligated to offer military 
assistance. Thus, Finland was burdened with appeasing the great power to the east. Beginning 
in the 1950s, Finland embarked upon a policy of neutrality. The country was no longer a 
buffer zone between two major powers, but rather a rimstate located within the defensive 
area surrounding the great power of the USSR (Karsh 50). Neutrality was hence the only 
option Finland saw fit to defend its sovereignty without incurring the Kremlin's wrath. Such 
a policy also allowed the country to tentatively explore new foreign relationships aside from 
its special relationship with the USSR. Finland trod very lightly, as the main goal of 
neutrality was to not become involved in any superpower conflicts Oakobson 52). It knew 
only too well how its precarious geography could easily involve it in such disputes, and it 
constantly had to reassure the USSR of its benevolent intentions (Mouritzen 100) .The need 
for neutrality ruled out NATO membership, since the organization was essentially 
predicated on deterring Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe. 
Despite its precautions, Finland became twice embroiled in crises with the USSR. In 
the so-called Note Crisis of 1961, Russia interfered with Finnish domestic politics to ensure 
that a candidate of its choosing won the upconling elections. Both this crisis, along with the 
earlier Night Frost Crisis from 1958-1959, caused Finland to take even greater care to 
demonstrate its neutrality. Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen attempted to create "zones of 
peace" around his country to protect it from any potential Soviet incursions (Solsten and 
Meditz 61). Kekkonen advocated a neutral Northern Europe, which would presumably 
strengthen Soviet confidence in Finland and ensure his country's continued existence as a 
sovereign state. This more abstract form of defense, which could be conceived of as a form 
of soft security, demonstrates why Finland would conceive of EU membership as a means 
of safeguarding its sovereignty. This history of a defensive yet neutral foreign policy informed 
Finland's decision to join the EU, an organization which can be seen as creating an even 
greater zone of peace. 
The collapse of the USSR changed Finland's defense strategy but did not have much 
of an effect on Norway's policy. Finland's defense was built around neutrality and 
appeasement of the empire to the east, which had now disintegrated. The fall of the USSR 
voided the FCMA Treaty, freeing Finland to go ahead with plans to join the EO. However, 
even after the fall of the USSR, joining NATO still was not a real option for two reasons. 
First, although Finland replaced its neutrality with non-alignment, tllis policy still ruled out 
NATO membership. Second, Russia was - and still is - generally opposed to NATO's 
expansion. Helsinki had appeased Moscow for so long that a type of conciliatory policy 
toward Russia was still deeply ingrained in Finnish policymakers. Consequently, for Finland, 
joining the EU was an acceptable way for it to increase its security, since it did not present 
a potential nlilitary threat to Russia . The EU provided "soft security" in the form of power 
and prestige (Mouritzen 103) while still allowing Finland to claim non-aligned status. In an 
address to the Assembly of the Western European Union in 1997, Finnish president Martti 
Ahtisaari remarked, "By being fully integrated into the European Union but remaining 
militarily non-allied we contribute to a controlled process of change with maximum 
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stability in the northern part of our continent" Oakobson 144). It was in Finland's national 
interest to increase regional stability and reduce the chance of war in its backyard while 
remaining non-aligned. Membership in the EU satisfied such a goal. 
Finland's neutrality succeeded in protecting the country's sovereignty during the Cold 
War, demonstrating that the success or failure of past security policies inform.s current 
decisions on defense matters. Therefore, Finland was not likely to suddenly change course 
and join military or defense organizations. Likewise, countries that had lost their sovereignty 
to Moscow, such as the Baltic states, went ahead with joining NATO because they were 
eager to distance themselves from their former ruler and secure themselves from any future 
Russian encroachments. The accession of the Baltic states near Finland's southern edge to 
both NATO and the EU helped bring about more stability and peace in northern Europe. 
Finland's security was enhanced even though the country could still remain militarily non-
aligned. Notably, Finland has been a strong proponent of such EU expansion, which 
increases its security by creating ever larger zones of peace. The other two Nordic states in 
the EU, Sweden and Denmark, do not have such a lengthy history of foreign interference 
in their domestic politics and military threats from neighboring countries, so they are less 
concerned with supporting EU expansion. Nevertheless, it is still improbable that Finland 
will join NATO. Particularly in light of Russia's recent ruminations on using force against 
the organization in Kosovo ("Russia Could Use Force"), Finland will in all likelihood 
continue to stay out of the defense organization for its own safety. As Russia begins to flex 
its muscles on the European and world stages, it can be expected that Finland will seek to 
eluphasize soft power and promote ever greater EU expansion while trying to iluprove EU-
Russia ties. By this logic, it would not be surprising if Finland were one of the first countries 
to support Russia if it ever expressed a desire to join the ED. 
POST-COLD WAR FACTORS: THE ECONOMY 
Geography was also important in determining the make-up of the economies in 
Norway and Finland because in both cases, the main export was a natural resource. 
However, one of the major differences between the two export-driven economies 
concerned the type of commodity most likely to be sold overseas. Norway exported mostly 
oil and fish, while timber dominated Finland's exports. Norway's strong, petroleum-driven 
economy provided a major reason for the country to reject EU membership. In the 1970s, 
the country discovered oil in the North Sea. These deposits have fueled the economy ever 
since and have also granted Norway the financial ability to remain outside the ED. Oil 
profits subsidized the country's heavily protected farming and fishing industries, which were 
politically important even though they did not contribute very much to the country's GDP. 
Europe's need for oil, particularly from stable and reliable trading partners, also made 
Norway's exports extremely valuable and desirable. The EU did not place any protective 
measures on the fossil fuel, which in 2005 accounted for 52 percent of Norwegian exports 
(Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs).Thus, the main sector of the economy - petroleum 
- would not have received any tangible benefits from EU membership. In fact, Norway even 
had a large trade surplus with the European Economic Area at the time (Hveem 35) . The 
economic benefits ofEU membership, namely becoming part of a common market without 
restrictive tariffs, consequently did not resonate with the leading export sector of Norway. 
Equally important as oil in the debates was the more traditional and heavily subsidized 
fishing industry. For centuries, Norway's location along the plentiful North, Norwegian, and 
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Barents Seas made fishing a vitally important industry. Though it accounted for a mere 0.7 
percent of the country's GDP (Archer 115), it composed 6.7 percent of exports in 1991 
(Myrstad). As part of the European Free Trade Association, many of Norway's fish exports 
were already granted free access to the European market. But by choosing to rem.ain outside 
the EU, Norway could still protect its all-important fishing industry. Although there were 
still some tariffs on Norwegian fish, the country calculated that the political benefits of 
staying outside the organization were greater than the economic benefits gained by joining. 
For instance, if Norway joined the EU, it would have had to repeal a law allowing only 
Norwegians to own fishing vessels registered in Norway (EFTA 12). Such a move would 
have greatly angered fishermen. Furthermore, EU membership would have mandated 
opening up Norwegian seas to foreign fishers, which would have weakened the state's 
jurisdiction over nunagement of its prized fish stocks. Letting go of some of its sovereignty 
may have benefited Norway in the long run, as statistics show that it loses out on 1.5 billion 
kroner (approximately 282.2 million dollars) per year as a result of not being in the EU 
(Kristiansen). These losses mostly come in the form of tariffs that are imposed on products 
such as Norwegian salmon. But at the time of the accession debates, the political 
ramifications of EU membership outweighed the possible economic benefits. 
EU membership would have also reduced cherished agricultural subsidies. In the 
Norwegian economy, up to 80 percent of the total value of agricultural output comes from 
subsidies (Arter 140) . Furthermore, in 1990, subsidies composed 5.5 percent of Norway's 
GDP, which was four times the average amount in other industrialized countries. If the 
country were to join the EU, agricultural subsidies would have decreased, as those provided 
by the Norwegian government could not have exceeded limits put in place by the 
Conullon Agricultural Policy (Archer, The 1995 Enlargement 155). Norway's vast oil 
resources allowed the country to continue its inefficient but popular agricultural subsidies. 
In the rural northern regions of Norway, where more farmers lived than in the southern 
urbanized areas, 70 percent of people voted against EU membership (Arter 140). The 
resounding "no" vote to membership demonstrated the deep level of opposition within the 
agricultural conununity, a group with massive political and financial clout. 
The microeconomic costs on each Norwegian farmer and fisherman generated 
enough public opposition to counteract the benefits ofEU membership propounded by the 
government and Norwegian trade organizations. The government, led by the Labour Party, 
was officially in favor of EU membership and claimed that it would help secure market 
access for Norway's exports and ensure the health of Norway's economy and welfare state 
in the long run (Gstohl 179). Business and trade associations like the Confederation of 
Norwegian Business and Industry also supported EU membership, but such associations had 
a difficult time generating grassroots support since they did not easily generate public 
sympathy. Farmers and fishers had an easier time mobilizing grassroots opposition to EU 
membership thanks to their inherently populist, nationalist appeal, and their political 
organization was strong. The Norwegian Farmers' Union was a major contributor to the 
'No to the EU' campaign (Archer 60). The Centre Party and Socialist Left Party, the two 
leading opponents of Norway joining the EU, believed that membership would erode the 
exclusive fishing rights of Norwegian coastal communities (Archer 116).The whole concept 
of integrating Norway into Europe proved so divisive that earlier, in 1990, the Centre Party 
resigned from the center-right coalition government over a failure to reach a compromise. 
The coalition government consequently lost power and was replaced by the left-leaning 
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Labour Party. Thus, if Norway had joined the EU, the political fallout could have been 
disastrous, as the farmers and fishers had already demonstrated their ability to mobilize. The 
govermnent, despite its preference for EU membership, could not afford to push too hard 
for integration if it still wanted to retain the support of key constituencies. Political leaders 
and parties in Norway in favor ofEU membership, consequently, were been unable to rally 
the citizens to their side. In fact, in November 1992, the "No to the European Community" 
campaign had more members than any Norwegian political party (Mj0set 128). Interest 
groups hence demonstrated more power than political parties in the debate over EU 
membership. 
For Finland, the collapse of the USSR wreaked havoc on its economy since the two 
countries had been such important trade partners. Beginning in 1951 , the Soviets and Finns 
negotiated the first of a series of five-year trading agreements which would last until the 
1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev's instituted perestroika, or economic reforms . These bilateral 
trading agreements mandated that the balance of trade equal zero. Finland was assured oil 
and other important natural resources from the USSR, and it had a guaranteed market in 
Russia for its manufactured goods like technology and paper products (Eronen 37). 
Although perestroika dismantled these agreements and gave Russia free rein to look to other 
markets, Finland still remained heavily dependent on Russia as a trade partner. Thus, when 
the USSR fell apart in 1991, Finland's GDP dropped 5.9 percent and continued to fall until 
1994, when EU negotiations began (Torvi 1999). At the time of accession, uneITlployment 
stood at 18.5 percent, while the country was deep in debt (Arter 130). Finland's economy 
was in a terrible state of recession and in desperate need of stimulus. The leading export 
industries, the agricultural political party, and the general population largely supported EU 
membership, which contrasted with the picture in Norway. 
One of the biggest actors in the Finnish economy, the timber industry,favoredjoining 
the EU, while in Norway, the dominant oil industry was opposed. Finland's small coastline 
was not as rich in resources as Norway's, so the country turned inland to harvest its 
abundant forests, which covered 72 percent of the terrain (Kotisaari). In Finland, timber and 
forestry products composed close to 40 percent of net export income (Solsten and Meditz 
200). At the time of accession, 80 percent of these products were exported to the EO. 
Timber exports suffered from French protectionism (Arter 130) and their prices were more 
volatile than oil, making them a less reliable and valuable commodity than Norway's main 
export. If Finland remained outside the EU, one of the main sectors of its economy would 
have been negatively affected, whereas this was not the case in Norway. 
While Finland also had vocal opposition to EU membership from its agricultural 
sector, strong macroeconomic reasoning defeated interest groups' relatively unpersuasive 
microeconomic concerns. The farmers' argued that they would suffer heavy fiscal losses if 
the Finnish market was opened up to cheaper foodstuffs from the continent. Due to the 
country's northerly latitude and difficult growing conditions, Finnish farmers' production 
prices were on average 30 percent higher than those of their Danish counterparts, who were 
their main competitors (Arter 141). But the larger macroeconomic picture of Finland 
painted dreary statistics, as mentioned above. Furthermore, agriculture composed only 3 
percent of the GDP Oakobson 108), whereas a sector like timber, which would benefit from 
EU membership, was economically much more important. Interestingly, the agriculture and 
timber industries in Finland were interlinked: in the 1980s, 35 percent of all the country's 
forests were controlled by private farmers. These forests were also highly productive, 
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generating 75-80 percent of the industry's wood (Solsten and M editz 170). T he overlap 
between the two industries m eant that many farmers actually had a vested interest in j oining 
the EU because it would benefit their timber sales. Accordingly, though agriculture proved 
to be an inevitably contentious and emotional issue, Finland could not afford to stay out of 
the EU just to placate those farmers without a stake in the timber industry. Even the Centre 
Party in Finland, which represented farmers' interests, was officially in favor of j oining the 
EU (unlike in N orway), though only 36 percent of its party members voted 'yes' in the 
referendum. Political leadership in Finland actually supported EU membership across party 
lines (R aunio and T iilikainen 48) , but as the Centre Party demonstrated , there was much 
division among the rank-and-file m embers of each party. Such discord within the individual 
parties was one reason why Finland decided to hold a popular referendum instead of 
deciding the issue of membership in Parliam ent, where it would have been difficult for party 
leaders to achieve consensus even within their own parties Oakobson 109) . Again, as in 
N orway, political parties were not highly important in persuading the populace to vote a 
certain way. Instead, groups that played a role in the economy, such as the timber and 
agricultural industries, had more clout. 
A majority of the general population in Finland also thought EU membership would 
help the economy, unlike in N orway. On the w hole, 53 percent of Finns in favor of EU 
m embership believed the economy was an im.portant factor in j oining, while only 28 
percent of Finns against EU mem.bership felt the sam e way. H ence, a definite maj ority of 
people supported the EU in part because of foreseen economic benefits , while those who 
opposed membership did not do so as much on economic grounds. In Norway, those 
numbers were somewhat reversed: though the number of people who thought that EU 
membership would have a positive effect on the economy was still larger than those who 
thought it would have a negative effect (47 percent to 37 percent, respectively) , a greater 
percentage of people in Norway than in Finland felt that the EU would harm their 
economy (Oskarson and Ringdal 151-152). Popular opinion was extremely important, since 
in both countries the voters decided the issue of EU membership in a referendum. In 
Finland , macroeconomic concerns defeated microeconomic ones because of the deep 
recession and the way in which the minor industry of farming actually overlapped with the 
maj or industry of timber. In Norway, conversely, the strong health of the major economic 
sectors enabled the minor, microeconomic concerns of small interests groups like farmers 
and fishermen to mobilize popular support against EU membership. 
FUTURE POLICY TOWARD THE EU 
If Norway's oil and gas run out, the country may have to reevaluate its position 
outside the EU. H owever, according to a 2007 report on Norway by the European Free 
Trade Association, current levels of oil production are expected to last for at least a century, 
and oil prices have been rising to record levels as of late. Meanwhile, N orway can wait and 
see whether the EU will continue to expand and strengthen or whether it has in fact 
integrated as much as possible. Some Euro-skeptics have been particularly vindicated by the 
French and Dutch rej ections of the proposed EU constitution. N orway's security is also 
already assured by its membership in NATO, so until the EU can offer some tangible 
security benefits, defense will not serve as a reason to join. On the other hand, Russia still 
continues to engender nervousness and suspicion in Finland, making EU n1.emhership and 
integration all the more important in its eyes. Finland's parliament ratified the EU 
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constitution by a large majority in late 2006. The country has been consistently pro-
expansionist in its EU policy, in contrast to its neighbor Nordic states and fellow EU 
members Denmark and Sweden (Raunio and Tiilikainen 13), which have both delayed 
ratification of the constitution. Unlike these two countries, Finland has also adopted the 
euro, which could be seen as a type of economic security measure. M embership within the 
conUllon market and currency union of the EU means that Russia, which has occasionally 
resorted to worrying tactics such shutting off natural gas to other countries, is no longer 
Finland's biggest trade partner (Statistics Finland) .As Finland integrates further into the EU, 
its security and economy strengthen while the country can still maintain its position of non-
alignment. The depth of its relationship with Brussels has transcended geography,for Finland 
has entered the political core of the EU even though it lies on its geographic outer edge. 
However, as Finland enmeshes itself more deeply into Europe and as the EU develops its 
military capabilities, the country will have to come to terms with whether it really still is 
non-aligned. Time will tell whether Finland will turn against further EU integration and 
whether Norway will end up joining the EU. 
CONCLUSION 
We have seen that issues of identity and sovereignty might not be as important factors 
in determining EU policy for Norway and Finland as geography, security, and economics. 
If Norway were really so concerned about maintaining a unique identity, it probably would 
not have joined NATO. Furthermore, Finland was constantly under pressure from the 
USSR until just a few years before accession, but it willingly and quickly entered into the 
EU instead of attempting to take charge of its newfound independence in policy-making. 
Security and economic issues can be traced back to Norway and Finland's geography. 
Norway was fortunate to lie in a relatively inaccessible, resource-rich part of Europe. Its 
isolation granted it security, while its long coasts and position next to the North Sea 
endowed it with oil and fishing resources ample enough to fuel an entire national economy. 
Finland, on the other hand, was situated right next to Russia, a great power that interfered 
in its domestic politics and deeply influenced its foreign policy, first of neutrality and now 
of non-alignment. Its proximity to Russia also made it a natural economic partner.Although 
this benefited Finland for decades, having a guaranteed trade partner came back to haunt 
Finland once the USSR collapsed. In terms of natural resources, Finland's expansive forests 
provided fertile ground for a timber industry, but forestry exports were subject to more 
protective lueasures from the EU than oil and fish. Integration was therefore crucial for 
sustained economic growth. The agricultural sector and the general public were both in 
favor of EU membership in Finland, while these groups held the opposite viewpoints in 
Norway. Joining the EU was a way for Finland to bolster its security and strengthen its 
economy while maintaining its foreign policy of non-alignment. Norway had already 
accomplished the first two of these objectives thanks to its membership in NATO and 
natural resources, and it was not concerned with remaining a neutral actor. Integration 
worked to Norway's disadvantage and Finland's advantage. Today, it would take a major shift 
of security or economic circumstances to change either country's policy toward the EU. 
This analysis of the intersection of geography with security and economics and their 
combined effects on Norway and Finland's policies toward the EU can be used to make a 
nUluber of predictions regarding other countries. Firstly, while geography has historically 
played a major role in determining a country's foreign policy, it is clear that in this globalized 
Norwegian and Finnish Policy toward the European Union
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age, it is of less import. Finland has become one of the most integrated members of the EU 
even though it lies on the periphery of the continent and is farther away from the core of 
Europe than Norway. Similarly, Turkey wants to join the EU even though its geographical 
status as part of Europe is debatable. In regards to geography's effects on security policies, it 
should be investigated more fully whether countries bordering great powers are more likely 
to choose a path of neutrality or seek to align themselves with a contiguous power or bloc. 
Finland has tried to do both simultaneously; on the other hand, the Baltic states are a good 
example of countries that have sought to distance them.selves from one great power (Russia) 
while allying with the one to the west (the EU). In terms of economics, countries with a 
large amount of valuable natural conunodities such as oil will likely not actively seek out 
integration into supranational bodies, trade organizations, or other institutions that would 
diminish their control over their resources. For instance, the discovery of oil in Scotland in 
the 1970s set off a number of calls for Scottish independence from the United Kingdom 
with the slogan, "It's Scotland's Oil." Likewise, accession into the World Trade Organization 
has become less of an ilmnediate concern to the Russian government now that oil prices 
are high. It can afford to stay out of this organization in the short term thanks to its massive 
oil exports. Unless the WTO begins regulating oil, then resource-rich countries will not 
have as strong of an incentive as they otherwise would to join. On the other hand, countries 
that export products subject to tariffs will be more enthusiastic about joining customs 
unions, common markets, and other organizations that reduce trade barriers. Finally, the role 
of agriculture will continue to be an emotionally charged issue, yet economic efficiency will 
likely win out over sentimentality in the end. Countries will only be able to refuse 
integration and continue subsidies if they possess the requisite financial resources. Thus, the 
historical aspects of geographical location, along with more current issues of security and 
economy, will continue to play roles in determining countries' policies toward international 
organizations. 
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ApPENDIX 
Map 1: Europe 
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